Although no withdrawal is expected in Syria in the short term, the future of support for the Kurds is uncertain.
For the Americans, support for the SDF should continue as a pressure factor on the ground to shape the Syrian government and break Iran’s influence. But it seems inevitable that they will reach a point where they can say, ‘Yes, it’s time to go.’ This is a prediction that the Americans do not deny.
In an interview with TASS on the sidelines of the Astana meeting, the Kremlin’s Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev called Turkey an ‘occupying force.’
He says other important things regarding Syria. But I think the term “occupier” is too much for those who think they deserve to be in Syria. Normally, Russia characterizes all forces other than Russian and Iranian forces that are in Syria at the invitation of Damascus as occupiers. The Turkish military presence is no exception. But for the sake of the Astana partnership, it did not play its cards so openly. This is changing because the Russian equation in Syria with Turkey and Iran is likely to shift to Turkish-American cooperation. In a sense, the Russians are intimidating President Tayyip Erdoğan, who is expecting gestures from Donald Trump.
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As far as we can see, while Turkish pressure on the US to withdraw its troops is functional, there are consequences for Russia that should be avoided:
– First, Turkish-American relations open up new areas of control for Turkey
In 2019, Turkey entered Tal Ebyad and Ras al-Ayn following Trump’s decision to withdraw, although it was halted on the eighth day. A repeat of such a scenario could strengthen Erdoğan’s hand in Damascus-Ankara negotiations. It could also weaken the assumption that “the Turkish army will eventually leave Syria” on which the phased withdrawal formula for Damascus-Ankara normalization is based.
– Second, an agreed withdrawal between Ankara and Washington would return Erdoğan to the old American game of targeting Damascus.
Putin wants to bring Erdoğan to Damascus in a compromise. However, Erdoğan’s intention to make a deal with Trump and expand the occupation in the north could upset the Kremlin’s strategy. Moreover, Syria’s future is increasingly linked to Israel’s multi-front war. Moscow must feel that it is futile at this stage to spend too much time on Damascus-Ankara normalization. That is why the Russians believe that after Trump takes office on Jan. 20, if a deal to end the war in Ukraine is reached, it would be a good idea to negotiate on Syria immediately.
It is unlikely that the equation in Syria will change without ending the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and reaching the conditions to reduce tensions between Iran and Israel. This includes the withdrawal of American forces.
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Lavrentiev said it was premature to talk about the withdrawal of American forces, but citing Trump’s pledge to end wars, he said, “We think there will be changes… We hope that there will be definite agreements on some issues, including Syria… It’s time to end the conflict.”
Noting that the retaliations between Israel and Iran continue, he draws attention to something else: “There are attempts to drag Syria into an armed conflict.”
Russia is doing several things to prevent this scenario:
– It warns Israel to refrain from attacks that could endanger Russian forces.
– It expects Tel Aviv not to expand its targets in Syria. And by ‘expanding’ we mean moving away from targets linked to Iran and Hezbollah.
– It is trying to prevent Iran-linked elements from opening a front against Israel from the occupied Golan.
Ensuring that Syria does not take an active part in the front against Israel and limiting Iranian-linked structures could be the starting point for a possible Russian-American dialogue.
At this point, the Russian approach to the American presence in Syria becomes important. Lavrantiev’s language is remarkably surgical.
The US has played and will continue to play an important role with its presence in northeastern Syria, he said. “Of course, their views will have to be taken into account and negotiated with them. Trump likes to make deals; let’s see what he proposes,” he said. “But it is still almost impossible to achieve peace in Syria without taking into account what is happening in Lebanon, in the Gaza Strip, and between Israel and Iran.”
It is not surprising that while waiting for Trump, the Russians have been somewhat indifferent to Erdoğan’s plea for a meeting with Assad, who has gone into pleading mode. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has also said that the Russians are neutral on normalization and are not pressuring Damascus intensively.
According to Lavrantiev, there is no possibility of a meeting between the leaders of Turkey and Syria under the current circumstances. It is even premature to talk about moving some of the contacts between the defense ministries to the ministerial level, which have been going on in a quadrilateral format. He stresses that Syria-Turkey normalization is a guarantee for stabilizing the situation. But he cites two factors that prevent this:
“First of all, Turkey’s support for the opposition, which cannot be left unclaimed and uncared for. And of course, the main issue is the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the occupied Syrian territory. Let’s put a name to everything: They are basically acting like an occupying country. That’s why it’s difficult for Damascus to engage in dialogue without getting firm guarantees from Turkey that it will withdraw its troops.”
It is not realistic for Putin to pressure Assad for a deal that does not guarantee the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Perhaps Erdoğan is also using the potential of a deal with Trump to force Putin to pressure Assad.
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There are reasons why Russia is waiting for Trump. The status quo is bound to be broken and the opportunity will develop for Russia. The effort to remove Iran from Syria could potentially form the basis of a Russian-American partnership. But Ankara can also buy US sensitivity to Iran. It can tell Trump that if you don’t want Iran to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of troops, including oil and gas fields, you can rely on your NATO partner and leave the field to Turkey.
If a way can be found to deal with the Kurds that doesn’t require a rebuke from Congress, it may be in Trump’s interest for Turkey to take charge of the situation.
But in the north, such a Turkish-American relations is no substitute for a Russian-American dialogue. This is because cutting Iran’s arms and creating conditions to satisfy Israel along the Syrian-Lebanese lines, as well as the Golan Heights, requires more than one negotiating table. In terms of these goals, the Russian role in Syria is much more essential.
It seems inevitable that the US will address the situation with Turkey, Russia and other regional partners.
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Apart from the Iranian and Israeli factors, the American-Russian dialogue requires an internal solution regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In other words, after the Israeli-Iranian issues, it is inevitable that the issue will be this.
For Russia, it is necessary to guarantee Turkey’s withdrawal from Syria, and for the US, it is necessary to take Ankara’s sensitivities into account in order not to escalate the crises between the two NATO members.
The future of the de facto autonomous structure, particularly the SDF, is the subject of negotiations at both tables.
Ankara is waiting for Trump to turn over a new page by cutting support to the SDF in a bid to repair bilateral relations.
Turkish ruling AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik says the Turkish Armed Forces is in a position to start a ground operation in Syria as soon as the order is given. “Our most important sensitivity is to maintain a depth of 30 kilometers,” he says. He emphasizes that any organization in Iraq and Syria up to a depth of 30 kilometers from the borders would be considered a first-degree threat. However, insisting on military action is unlikely to be welcomed by the US or Russia as it was in 2019. “We do not accept, we have repeatedly stated this,” Lavrentiev reiterated the Russian position on the possibility of new Turkish military operations during a press conference in Astana.
The Kurds are hoping that Trump will not repeat what he did in 2019, when he came with a team that both shields Israel and wants continued support for the Kurds. But we also know that the Americans have told the SDF, “We cannot stay in Syria forever.”
The PKK line stretching from Qandil to Syria and Europe seems ready to take shifting positions according to the expectation that the US-backed Israeli military operations will change the borders in the Middle East. As soon as he took office, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said, “The Kurds are a great nation, one of the nations that do not have political independence. They are our natural allies”, which resonated with the Kurds. A transformation from a stance that in the past clashed with Israel alongside the Palestinians in Lebanon to one that values the Jewish lobbying power on the global level and sees the possibility of establishing relations with Tel Aviv is noteworthy.
Trump’s choice of Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, and Marco Rubio as Secretary of State are perceived as insurance for the Kurds.
Waltz and Rubio, both members of the Kurdish Caucus in Congress, strongly opposed Trump’s decision to withdraw troops in 2019. But these are not personalities with constants according to their specific weight. They are conjunctural personalities. That’s why Trump chose them. They can also adopt new positions according to the President’s preferences.
Trump’s priority is to cut Iran’s arms in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. CENTCOM is also increasing its fortifications in Syria in line with Israel’s expanding aggression. This month, 10 cargo planes landed at bases in Kharab al-Jir in the Hasakah countryside and the al-Omar oil field and Conoco gas field in the Deir az-Zor countryside. In addition, 115 trucks loaded with weapons and equipment have arrived in Syria from Iraq.
This fortification could serve Trump’s strategy of maximum pressure against Iran. This could mature the infrastructure for the withdrawal process from Syria. They may want to utilize the Kurds in this strategy.
In this context, the value of the Iraqi Kurdistan Government may increase. Although no withdrawal is expected in Syria in the short term, the future of support for the Kurds is uncertain. For the Americans, support for the SDF should continue as a pressure factor on the ground to shape the Syrian government and break Iran’s influence. But it seems inevitable that they will reach a point where they can say, ‘Yes, it’s time to go.’ This is a prediction that the Americans do not deny.
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At the end of the day, the Americans can either abandon or cherish the Kurds, depending on how they deal with Russia and Turkey. Trump likes to make deals! The rebuff he received from CENTCOM in 2019 may not be tolerated this time. In Trump’s world, everything is negotiable. He will see how far he can push Iran back and what he can get from Russia and Turkey! There is also the possibility that this time he may enter into indirect or direct negotiations with Assad.
The appointment of Tulsi Gabbard, who traveled to Damascus and met with Assad, as Director of Intelligence strengthens this possibility. Like the rest of the team, Gabbard is a staunch supporter of Israel and believes that Syria does not have to be seen as an enemy of the United States. Such a channel could accelerate efforts to change Syria’s course.
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Like the Kurds, Turkey’s Öcalan initiative was triggered by the prediction that borders could change. But in reverse. While some within the same front emphasize the immutability of the borders with a two-pronged strategy (negotiation and bullying) without deviating from the collapse plan, others dream of an expanded Turkey that includes the Kurds if the borders will inevitably change. It seems that the dream marketers have also come into play.
We are entering a new period where the parties will review their options and put their cards on the table.
Depending on the changing factors, some scenarios can be considered.
First, the current status quo in Syria, which is divided into areas under the control of different powers, may continue for a while.
The second scenario is that under conditions where Iran’s logistical links between Syria-Iraq and Syria-Lebanon are cut off, the Kurds, with Russia’s support, could become part of the equation in Damascus. With Ankara’s consent, the US could withdraw.
Thirdly, a new equation with the Kurds can be established under the auspices of a Turkey that has made certain progress on the Kurdish issue and has aligned itself with American plans. This would mean Turkey falling out with Russia and Iran and moving away from the goal of normalization with Syria.
The fourth scenario is that if the negotiations between Turkey and the United States, and Russia and the United States break down, Erdoğan, who says “I am still hopeful about Assad”, may take the step of normalization with Damascus with Putin’s support and escalate the pressure on the Kurds. This option could reverse the decision of the US to withdraw, if it is to withdraw at all. This is what actually happened in 2019. If Turkey had not intervened quickly, the US would have left.
Some scenarios may intertwine and hybrid solutions may emerge.
